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Introduction 
Chinese criminal procedure is a fascinating object of study. It is particularly dynamic at the 
moment and reflects changes in Chinese social, political, and economic life. Criminal 
procedure law is constantly evolving by trying to accommodate various conflicting social needs 
and demands. The speed of legislative change in China is such that many recent academic 
works have already become outdated to a greater or lesser extent. For instance, McConville 
and Pils (2013), contains a long ‘Postcript’ (pp. 455-503) commenting on the 2012 revision of 
the Chinese Criminal Procedural Law CPL),i which post-dated the contributions to this major 
volume on criminal justice in China. Therefore, our aim in this paper is not primarily to produce 
an up-to-date description of Chinese criminal procedure, an account that would soon become 
outdated because of more reform, but to attempt to understand the dynamic of legislative 
change. There is a need to concentrate not so much on the specific provisions of criminal 
procedure law as on the forces which shape and determine their content. This study looks at 
the ideological forces, or the fundamental ideas which shape the structure of Chinese criminal 
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procedure law, although we will make some more practical, empirically based, observations 
where particularly relevant.  
 
The most prominent idea in Chinese criminal procedural law is that it is focused on ‘obtaining 
objective truth rather than satisfying rules of evidential discovery’ (Yin & Duff, 2010, p.1136; 
see also Zhang & Yang, 2018). This search for the truth is the reason why the principle of 
double jeopardy, or ne bis in idem, is still not accommodated by Chinese law. Reflecting the 
emphasis on the search for the truth, until the reforms under the ‘2010 Evidence Rules’ (Lewis, 
2011, p 631; Lin, Gu & Chen, 2017; Sun, 2018) there were in reality few rules on admissibility 
(Lewis, 2011, pp. 650-655; Guo, 2017). This was extremely significant because in China ‘the 
confession is king’ and to secure a confession was, and is, seen as vital in every criminal case 
(Belkin, 2013, p. 95; Guo, 2107). The undergoing reform of the law, however, attempts to 
reconcile the imperative of establishing truth with the idea of a fair trial (Long, 2015b). As we 
shall see, an important part of this was establishing the principle of admissibility as a practical 
reality. It is important to note that the Chinese concept of fair trial is different from its western 
counterpart. It goes beyond the concept of individual autonomy and affirms a variety of social 
and moral values. Chinese procedural criminal law attempts to present a greater unity between 
law and morals which aims to lead to an acceptance of the outcome of criminal proceedings by 
the public (and a greater efficiency).  
 
Thus, the subject of this research is to examine the way in which Chinese criminal procedure 
attempts to reconcile the search for the truth with the ideal of fair trial or procedural fairness.  
At the outset, there are two basic questions are to be answered. First, is the pursuit of 
substantive truth in Chinese law achieved at the expense of procedural certainty? Second, does 
this pursuit make impossible the establishment of procedural safeguards for fairness and the 
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rule of law? In tackling these two questions, considerable attention will be paid to the normative 
framework of Chinese criminal procedure because it is evident that, in practice, any system of 
criminal justice can be abused. Therefore, this research focuses not solely on the actual 
application of procedural rules but on analyzing the normative framework to perceive the way 
in which the imperative of finding the truth is related to the idea of procedural fairness. 
  
Truth v Fairness 
 
The amount of literature on Chinese criminal procedure law is substantial and, as noted above, 
much of it has become outdated because of the speed of legislative reform. The literature that 
deals with the foundational ideas of Chinese criminal procedure tends to focus on two basic 
issues. The first is the attempt to categorise Chinese law generally within a particular family of 
legal systems (David & Brierley, 1985; Zweigert & Kotz, 1998; Glenn, 2014) and, more 
particularly, within a particular model of criminal trial (see Yin & Duff, 2010, for further 
references and discussion of this literature.) The second issue concerns the extent to which 
Chinese criminal procedure law reflects the principles of the rule of law and fair trial, along 
with the idea of human rights (McConville, 2013).  
 
In relation to the first issue, there is a general consensus that China follows an inquisitorial 
model of criminal trial, meaning that the emphasis is on finding the truth rather than on the 
prosecution or defence winning the contest as in the adversarial model (Damaska, 1973). 
Nevertheless, some authors point to the influence of adversarial ideology since the reforms of 
1996 (McConville, 2011, p. 10). However, this trend has also been noted in European 
inquisitorial jurisdictions, largely owing to the influence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, leading several comparative scholars to speculate that the adversarial and inquisitorial 
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traditions are converging (Weigend, 2003; Jorg, Field & Brandt, 1993; McConville, 2013, pp. 
50-51). Nevertheless, significant ideological differences remain between these two models 
(Roberts, 2008). A number of commentators on Chinese criminal procedure have noted the 
difficulties of combining both the inquisitorial and adversarial traditions in the Chinese legal 
context (Capowski, 2011; Liu & Halliday, 2009). Yu (2007, 69-70), for example, wrote that 
‘the absence of witnesses in the Chinese court contrasts with this reformed adversarial format.’ 
In this context, it is interesting to note that in Europe, inquisitorial systems have been forced 
by decisions of the European Court of Human Rights to provide the defence with more 
opportunity to confront and question prosecution witnesses either at trial or as part of the formal 
pre-trial procedures.ii 
 
For some Chinese scholars, the inconsistencies between inquisitorial and adversarial systems 
are of little practical significance. Professor Wei Pei from Beihang School of Law in Beijing, 
in correspondence with one of the authors of this article, expressed an attitude common among 
Chinese scholars as well as practitioners. In her view, there is no contradiction between the 
adversarial and inquisitorial elements of the revised Chinese law on criminal procedure. A 
Chinese judge does not per se have the obligation to verify the evidence presented at trial. If 
there is doubt about the evidence presented in court by the prosecutor or the defense, the judge 
has limited power to demand or collect additional evidence. In Chinese criminal procedure, the 
way to discover truth is not through confrontation with witnesses but through the cooperation 
of all official participants in the process. Indeed, this view is very clearly articulated in Article 
7 of the CPL: ‘In conducting criminal proceedings, the People's Courts, the People's 
Procuratorates and the public security organs shall divide responsibilities, coordinate their 
efforts and check each other to ensure the correct and effective enforcement of law.’ 
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We would observe that, in the eyes of most comparative scholars, the Chinese judge’s limited 
involvement in the verification of evidence would be a hallmark of adversarial procedure while 
the emphasis on cooperation in this regard closely resembles that of inquisitorial ideology 
(Damaska, 1973; 1986). Therefore, according to Professor Wei Pei, both traditions seem to be 
comfortably accommodated within Chinese criminal procedure. In our view, however, there 
still exists an underlying tension: if the trial judge is not satisfied that the cooperative efforts 
of the parties have produced all the evidence that is, or might be, available, what should he do? 
Is his essential stance passive, as in the adversarial model, or active, as in the inquisitorial 
model? Further, how does the defence fit into this schema? In an adversarial model, the role of 
the defence in gathering and submitting evidence at trial is critical, yet under Article 7 above, 
the defence is not even mentioned (see Zuo & Ma, 2013;  Nesossi, 2013). 
 
In any event, it is difficult to identify Chinese criminal procedure law with a particular legal 
family. David and Brierley (1985, pp. 20-21) suggest that ideology, as embracing 
philosophical, political, and economic principles, is one of the two main criteria for 
differentiating legal families. Another possible criteria is the hierarchy of legal sources, 
institutions and methods. It is a mistake to think of procedural law as ideologically irrelevant 
because ‘criminal procedure, as “applied constitutional law”, is normally one of the most useful 
branches of law in terms of identifying the ideology of a regime’ (Yin & Duff, 2010, p. 1111; 
see also McConville, 2013). In this context, it is significant that in the United States, criminal 
procedure is perceived to be an aspect of constitutional law with all the political and ideological 
baggage which that entails (Whitebread & Slobogin, 2003: ch. 1). Similarly, Chinese criminal 
procedure law possesses constitutional significance. The Chinese constitution itself mentions 
some basic principles of criminal procedure, for example, the  right to counsel and the public 
nature of the trial (Article 125) as well as judicial independence (Article 126). But those 
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provisions remain very brief and undeveloped. Therefore, the criminal procedure law itself has 
become the main source of constitutional significance. Professor Ji Weidong calls it ‘our little 
constitution’ (Balme, 2012, p. 6) and refers to the enormous public attention that the 
undergoing reform of criminal procedure law has received in China. 
 
Some scholars describe the modern stage of the development of Chinese law as ‘breaking off 
the shackles of ideological domination’ or ‘the abandonment of ideology’ (Chen, 2008, p. 75) 
but Chinese criminal procedure still contains a strong ideological element. Article 1 of the CPL 
claims that ‘maintaining socialist public order’ is one of its purposes. Article 6 of the same law 
requires that ‘in conducting criminal proceedings, the People's Courts, the People's 
Procuratorates and the public security organs must rely on the masses.’ Nevertheless, it is 
evident that the presence of Marxist or Maoist statements in Chinese criminal law legislation 
has been gradually reduced (Keith & Lin, 2001, p. 207). The ideological shift from class 
struggle to the maintenance of law and order is apparent to many commentators (Chen, 2013, 
p. 62). The ideological content of criminal procedure can be seen not merely in the general 
political statements from the legislation quoted above, but also in the political and moral values 
protected or neglected in its provisions. Some writers, for example, note a weak expression of 
the idea of individual legal autonomy in the procedural structure itself.  As Yin and Duff put 
it: the purpose of Chinese procedural law ‘is not to resolve conflicts amongst individuals but 
to achieve a collectivist society and socialist morality’ (2010, p. 1106). The dominant position 
of the Communist Party and political doctrine in criminal law and procedure is also identifiable 
and striking (McConville, 2013). 
 
It is apparent to most commentators that Chinese criminal procedure has abandoned the Soviet 
law model in which ‘the administration of justice was rendered mainly by the security agencies 
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and special tribunals’ (Yin & Duff, 2010,  p. 1112). Even though China has now adopted many 
elements of the civil law tradition, the predominance of public law and the public good, rather 
than private interests, persists (McConville, 2013). This predominance has a long historical 
tradition in China. Confucianism contains an anti-capitalist and to some degree, a socialist 
sentiment, although it is not democratic by any means (Guo, 2003, p. 5). After the Maoist 
reaction against Confucianism (De Bary, 1998), the latter is experiencing a revival, to a limited 
extent, in modern Chinese intellectual culture (Bell, 2008, p. 22). It is very difficult to isolate 
the Confucian element in the Chinese socialist system, as Confucianism has never been an 
influence which can be disentangled and viewed in isolation from the rest of Chinese culture. 
From the beginning, it was intermingled with the Chinese philosophical tradition of Legalism 
which also persists in modern China (Chen, 2008, p. 20). Thus, Chinese law can be generally 
classified within the socialist law family (Yin & Duff, 2010), but also including the Confucian 
and Legalist philosophical traditions. One apparent influence of Confucianism can be seen in 
the idea that criminal procedural law has an educational function. Article 2 of the CPL, for 
example, states that its aim is ‘to enhance the citizens’ awareness of the need to abide by law 
and to fight vigorously against criminal acts.’  
 
Against this backdrop, many authors suggest that Chinese criminal procedure law lacks the 
idea of a fair trial, sometimes explaining this by its adherence to inquisitorial ideology (Simon, 
Feng & Nelson, 2016, p. 4; see also Nesossi, Biddulph, Sapio & Trevaskes 2016) and 
sometimes by the specifically Chinese structural and cultural contexts of the court’s 
proceedings (Lu & Miethe, 2007, p. 21; Chen, 2008, p. 324). The assessment of fairness of 
Chinese criminal procedure is often influenced by the political views of commentators. 
Proponents of a liberal democracy may deny that the principle of fairness plays a significant 
role in the criminal justice process in modern China (Peerenboom, 2002, p. 14), a typical 
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conclusion being that ‘(t)he prevailing conception of class struggle rooted in the Chinese 
communist State has caused enduring inconsistency between Chinese criminal procedure and 
western notions of the rule of law’ (Yin & Duff, 2010, p. 1113).  
 
Not all authors, however, apply western notions to describe the Chinese position. Some claim 
that the idea of a fair trial is not new to China by tracing it back to the Qing Dynasty, if not 
earlier (Zhang, 2014, p. 390). It is acknowledged that Communist China at its outset operated 
with a very different set of ideas from those of the rule of law, fair trial, and human rights (Fang 
& Li, 2017, p. 10). However, since 1978, there have been clear signs that Chinese law and 
policy makers are trying to ensure that the principle of fairness (in the Chinese understanding) 
is realized (Blasek, 2015, p. 64). In more practical terms, this new policy has led to the abolition 
of the police power to order re-education through the labour system in 2013 (Xinhua, 2013) 
which was widely considered as inconsistent with the idea of rule of law and fair trial (Zou, 
2006, p. 186). In the next section, we will try to demonstrate how the concept of a fair trial is 
now reflected in the texts of Chinese criminal procedure legislation.iii   
 
The Exclusionary Rule 
If evidence testifies to the truth, but it was obtained by inappropriate or illegal means, such as 
torture, should or should not judges take it into account in reaching their verdict? The answer 
to this question reveals a lot about the relationship between truth and procedural fairness in any 
individual criminal procedure system and that state’s ideological stance om balancing 
individual autonomy and civil liberties against society’s need to deal with crime and maintain 
public order. Therefore, it is extremely significant, particularly in view of the central role of 
the confession in China, that in 2010 a structured regime to exclude forced confessions was 
introduced to Chinese criminal procedure ‘with great fanfare’ (Belkin, 2013, p. 102) This was 
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achieved through the 2010 Evidence Rules, which were jointly issued by five government 
bodies and covered separate sets of rules relating to (1) evidence in death penalty cases and (2) 
the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.iv Lewis, (2011) provides a detailed account and 
analysis of the history of these reforms and the reasons behind them (see also Belkin (2013, pp 
98-105). In this context, it is the exclusionary rule which is of interest, and this important new 
element in Chinese criminal procedure was reinforced by the 2012 reforms to the CPL. Article 
54 states: 
 
 Confessions extorted from a criminal suspect or defendant by illegal means such as 
torture, testimony of witnesses and statements of victims collected by violent means, 
threat or other unlawful means shall be excluded. Physical evidence or documentary 
evidence that is not collected according to statutory procedures and is therefore likely to 
materially damage judicial justice shall be subject to correction or reasonable 
explanations and shall be excluded if correction or reasonable explanations are not made. 
Evidence that shall be excluded as found during investigation, examination before 
prosecution and trial shall be excluded in accordance with the law and shall not serve as 
the basis for making prosecution opinions, prosecution decisions and judgments. 
 
Even though this article has been criticized for making a distinction between evidence which 
must be excluded and the evidence which may be excluded (Sun, 2017, p. 167) (a distinction 
common in many jurisdictions (Duff, 2004: Roberts and Zuckerman, 2010, ch. 5), it is still an 
important procedural safeguard of fairness. 
 
There are at least three significant problems hindering successful application of the 
exclusionary rule in the Chinese context. The first problem is that the general idea of the 
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unacceptability of torture and violence in obtaining evidence may be interpreted differently 
because the concept of torture and violence depends on certain moral standards affirmed by an 
individual conscience or moral sense which differs from person to person. For example, 
interrogating a suspect for many hours late at night did not appear morally wrong to Soviet 
prosecutors (Solzhenitsyn, 2003) nor was ‘water-boarding’ deemed to be torture by the USA 
during the Bush presidency (Goldberg, 2007 p. 213). Guo (2017, pp 34-37) explains in detail 
the difficulties that the actors in the Chinese criminal justice system have faced in interpreting 
what constitutes torture of illegal means under Article 54. Further, in China, torture of an 
innocent is evil, but ‘torture of someone who ultimately appears to be guilty, however, seems 
to be something many are prepared to overlook’ (Daum, 2017).  
 
Second, the suppression of a confession will usually result in the prosecution simply obtaining 
a new and ‘flawless’ confession from the accused (Guo, 2017, p. 48). Daum (2017) describes 
some cases, when police or prosecutors, knowing that that a confession might be excluded, 
have simply carried out a new and lawful interrogation to get an admissible confession. Further, 
as Guo (2017, p. 39-40) explains, the accused will usually have made several confessions 
during the investigation process, both to the police and the Procuratorate, and if one is rendered 
inadmissible, then there is no consensus as to whether any subsequent confessions are thereby 
tainted and should be excluded by the court. Finally, there is no ‘fruit of the poisoned tree’ 
doctrine in Chinese evidentiary law and a new confession, to replace one that is inadmissible, 
or physical evidence obtained as a result of an inadmissible confession remain admissible 
(Gelkin. 2013, p. 107: Guo 39-40; Daum, 2017, pp.4-5). 
 
The third problem lies in the way law is perceived in China, as well as in many other countries, 
where criminal procedure is perceived as a command, rather than a set of principles for 
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adjudication. The inadmissibility of evidence obtained through torture, violence, or threat, does 
not fit comfortably with the image of law as a set of detailed instructions underpinned by the 
threat of punishment. It is somewhat vague, particularly in terms of its application. As Guo 
(2017, p. 40) observes, not having a ‘case law tradition’ to rely on, police, prosecutors and 
judges feel ‘helpless’ when trying to operationalize the principles underlying the admissibility 
test when a practice is not ‘expressly forbidden’.  Therefore, for many Chinese critics of the 
new law, it was not enough merely to express the principle of inadmissibility in statutory form 
in a country where people are more accustomed to obeying specific commands backed up by 
very specific sanctions (Sun, 2018). 
 
There was an attempt to address this problem by issuing more detailed rules on exclusion of 
illegal evidence. In June 2017, they were jointly issued by the Supreme People's Court, the 
Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security (Yi, 2017). The rules are 
contained in regulations entitled Notice of the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security and Other Departments on Issuing the 
Provisions on the Several Issues concerning the Strict Exclusion of the Illegally Collected 
Evidence in the Handling of Criminal Cases.v It is worth noting that the length of the name of 
this document is not unusual in China and reflects the ideology of cooperation between all state 
organs in legal regulations. The problem of the rules on admissibility being too general still 
persists however, because most of the above document’s provisions remain rather broad. 
Nevertheless, the rules do attempt to spell out in more detail the mechanisms for excluding 
illegal evidence. First of all, they emphasize the right of the accused to challenge the legality 
of the evidence before the procuratorate at the time of the investigation, in other words before 
the trial process begins (Article 14), and impose a duty on the investigating organ and the 
procuratorate to ensure that there was no incident of torture or a forced confession (Articles 15, 
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17). In order to strengthen the protection now offered to an accused, the new rules also require 
that at the commencement of the criminal court’s proceedings, the court must inform the 
accused of his right to apply for the exclusion of illegal evidence (Article 23). According to 
Article 33 of the same Rules, evidence that is disputed because the accused claims that he was 
mistreated during interrogation cannot be read or referred to in cross-examination before the 
court makes a decision on whether to exclude it or not. Nevertheless, it is clearly stated that if 
there is no proof that the evidence was obtained illegally, the court will refuse to exclude it 
(Article 24).  
 
Whereas these provisions do not require the accused to prove the facts of torture, violence or 
mistreatment etc., there is a great deal of confusion over the relevant evidential burdens (Lewis, 
2011, p. 665; Guo, 2017, pp. 41-45). It is accepted that the defence must provide some evidence 
in order to persuade the court to address the question as to whether a confession should be 
rendered inadmissible on the grounds of the accused’s ill treatment. Even this level of 
information can be difficult for the accused to secure, not least because there is uncertainty 
over the standard of proof, however minimal, which is required. If this weak evidential burden 
is met, in theory the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the confession was 
lawfully obtained. To this end, the following methods of proof are envisaged under the 2010 
exclusionary law: the provision of the interview transcripts, or audio or video recordings of the 
interrogation (the latter being compulsory in the most serious of cases); an interrogator 
testifying in court; or the provision of an official written explanation of the circumstances of 
the interview. It should also be noted that a physical examination of the arrested person is 
required to ensure that he did not suffer any physical violence or torture at the hands of the 
police or other state organs (Article 13 of the CPL). However, it would be somewhat naïve to 
believe that interrogating officers who have employed such methods are always likely to have 
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recorded the interrogation, and/or retained it, or will admit to anything unlawful in court or 
have left any physical signs of the mistreatment of the accused. It is worth observing that the 
only practical solution to the difficulty the accused faces in obtaining proof of torture, violence 
or its threat would be to require the police to prove that the interrogation was legitimate by 
producing the audio-video recording of it. If they do not do so, then any disputed confession 
given by the accused could be deemed inadmissible as evidence against the accused.  
 
In any event, at the moment, if the accused offers some proof of the illegality of his 
interrogation by the police, then the court should convene a pretrial conference to determine 
the issue (Article 25). Additionally, Article 182 of the CPL, among other things, now states: 
 
before the commencement of a court session, judges may convene a meeting with the 
public prosecutor, the party concerned and his/her defender and agent ad litem to 
deliberate and consult their opinions on withdrawal, the list of witnesses, exclusion of 
illegal evidence and other trial-relevant issues.  
 
A pretrial conference system is a new feature of Chinese criminal procedure law but it is worth 
observing that it is a mechanism which is common elsewhere. For example, pre-trial hearings 
aimed at settling all evidential issues before the trial starts have been held in Scotland and 
England, both of which are adversarial systems, for over twenty years (Renton and Brown, 
2018, chs. 17 &20; Blackstone’s Criminal Practice, 2008, D4, 5 & 15). Further, the Chinese 
model also resembles to some extent Article 17 of the United States Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (see US House of Representatives, 2016). Guo (2017: pp. 48-49) notes that in 
practice pre-trial conferences have not worked well in China in terms of excluding 
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illegitimately obtained confessions but, in our view, they could be turned into a more effective, 
if far from perfect, mechanism as they are in the jurisdictions mentioned above. 
 
Article 26 of the 2017 Rules states that if the public prosecutor and the defendant do not reach 
agreement on whether the collection of evidence has been legal in the pre-trial conference, and 
the people's court has doubts about the legality of the collection of evidence, the court shall 
conduct an investigation during the trial.vi According to Article 34, if the court has doubts about 
the legitimacy of the collection of evidence based on relevant testimony or materials, and the 
People’s Procuratorate fails to provide proof of its provenance or the proof provided cannot 
confirm the legitimacy of the evidence, and it cannot be ruled out that it was collected illegally, 
then the evidence should be excluded. However, Lewis points out that, traditionally, judges 
have been reluctant to ‘break with the police and prosecutors’ (2011, p. 683), and that senior 
Chinese academics express ‘skepticism’ the judiciary will have the ‘courage, ability and 
motivation’ to exclude evidence (2011, p. 689-690). It should be noted the decision of the court 
on exclusion of evidence can be appealed to the higher court (Article 40). It is evident that the 
effectiveness of the application of the exclusionary rule depends in the end on the capacity of 
a Chinese judge to doubt! But what if the judge is not trained to doubt or does not want to 
doubt?   
 
The Judge and Truth 
 
However, the practicalities of the Chinese trial system save Chinese judges to a great extent 
from the painful experience of doubt because, as in most modern systems of criminal justice, 
the majority of defendants plead guilty (McConville, 2012: Dobinson, 2013; Guo 2017, pp. 1-
2, 30-51), whether by right as in adversarial systems or in a disguised fashion as in inquisitorial 
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systems (see Weigend, 2008). Accordingly, Article 227 of the Interpretation of the Supreme 
People's Court on the Application of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of 
China, 2012 states: 
 
In a case where the defendant has pleaded guilty to charges, after confirming that the 
defendant understood the facts and charges alleged in the indictment, voluntarily pleaded 
guilty and knew the legal consequences of the guilty plea, the court’s investigation may 
mainly focus on sentencing and other controversial issues. In cases where the defendant 
does not plead guilty or the advocate maintains his innocence, the court investigation 
shall ascertain the facts related to sentencing on the basis of the facts establishing the 
guilt.vii  
 
Since a defendant rarely claims innocence, and there are not many controversial issues left, 
Chinese trials are notorious for their speed, normally taking only few minutes (Sun, 2018). In 
this context, it would require a significant effort by judges to attempt to examine whether 
confessions are truly voluntary and the extent to which they are credible and/or reliable. The 
CPL contains some conflicting principles in terms of the role of judges in questioning the 
genuineness of evidence in general and of confessions in particular. On the one hand, Article 
49 seems to suggest an adversarial model: ‘The burden of proof of guilt of the defendant in a 
public prosecution case shall fall on the people's procuratorate, while that in a private 
prosecution case shall fall on the private prosecutor.’ If such is the case, then judges should be 
normally be satisfied with what procurator presents in court providing that there are no 
objections to this evidence by the accused or a defence lawyer. In other words, they would not 
enquire into the method by which a confession was obtained. 
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On the other hand, Article 50 of the CPL perhaps implies a rather different and more active 
role for the judge: ‘Judges, prosecutors, and criminal investigators must, under legal procedures, 
gather various kinds of evidence that can prove the guilt or innocence of a criminal suspect or 
defendant and the gravity of crime.’ Article 191 also envisages a more involved role for judges 
and spells this out in the following way: ‘During a court hearing, if the collegial panel has 
doubts about the evidence, it may announce an adjournment, in order to carry out investigation 
to verify the evidence.’ It then sets out various powers the People's Court has been granted for 
this purpose, for example, allowing the court to seek an expert evaluation of scientific evidence.  
Further, Article 220 of Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the 
Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, 2012 similarly indicates that if the 
judge has any doubts about the evidence, active steps should be taken to resolve these: 
 
If the court has any doubt about the evidence, it may inform the public prosecutor, the 
parties and their legal representatives, the advocate, and agents ad litem to supplement the 
evidence or make explanations. If necessary, the court may announce an adjournment to 
investigate and verify the evidence.’ In other words, it is not a duty but it is within the 
discretion of the court to request additional information where it has doubts about the 
reliability of the evidence or presumably the method by which it was obtained. 
 
Once again, one can see that judicial doubt is paramount in dictating the extent to which 
Chinese judges are prepared to carry out their own investigation into the quality of the evidence 
and the method by which it was obtained. Informal interviews with Chinese academics, 
conducted by one of the authors, indicate that even if the Chinese judges do have doubts, this 
is rarely expressed in the use of their own initiative to investigate further, confirming the view 
of Lewis which was described above. Further, in view of the centrality of confessions in China, 
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McConville in a major empirical study found that judges very rarely challenged evidence from 
confessions (2012, p. 75). Be that as it may, Article 66 of the 2012 Interpretation imposes a 
duty on the court to inform the parties of the discovery of any important, new evidence: ‘when 
the people's court investigates and verifies the evidence and finds new evidence material that 
has a significant impact on the conviction and sentencing, it shall inform the procurator, the 
advocate, the private prosecutor and his legal representative.’ While this provision clearly 
covers what is often termed ‘fresh’ evidence, in the sense that it was hitherto completely 
unknown to any of the parties, it could, presumably also include evidence discovered by the 
judge that, for example, the police used illegitimate means to secure a confession from the 
accused during his interrogation. However, there is no duty laid upon the court to inform a 
defendant or a defence lawyer, again indicative of the mindset that the prosecution is a team 
effort by the state agencies, rather than an adversarial contest. 
 
One can see that the Chinese courts have enormous discretion to collect additional evidence. 
They also have the power to accept or reject submission of new evidence by the parties. The 
discretion to reject a submission, however, is burdened by a duty to provide reasons for the 
rejection: 
 
If during the trial before the court, the parties, their advocates, or agents ad litem request 
to notify the new witness to appear in court, to obtain new evidence, or apply for re-
assessment or inspection, then the name of the witness, the location of the evidence, the 
explanation in relation to the facts of the case, and the reasons for a new inquest or expert 
examination shall be provided. If the court deems it necessary to agree, it shall announce 
an adjournment of hearing; if it disagrees, it shall explain the reasons and continue the 
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trial (Supreme People's Court, Interpretation of the on the Application of the Criminal 
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, 2012, Article 222).  
 
The interpretation, however, does not specify the manner and the form in which this 
explanation must be given. 
 
It is obvious that, theoretically, the resolution of judicial doubt can be achieved only through 
an examination of all relevant materials collected by the procuratorate. It is unlikely, however, 
that without assistance, the court will be able to identify any relevant evidence that is not 
included in the file submitted to the court by the prosecution. In this regard, the role of a 
prosecutor and a defence lawyer is paramount in ensuring disclosure to the court of all relevant 
information in the hands of the police or in the prosecutor’s file. 
 
The Prosecutor and Truth 
While it is possible for a private person to initiate criminal proceedings, it is the procuratorate 
which has the sole power to initiate public prosecution (Article 3 of CPL). The Chinese 
procuratorate takes a unique position in Chinese criminal procedure, since it is not only the 
public prosecutor but also the public guardian of lawfulness, the authority to approve arrests 
and the organ empowered to conduct investigations (Article 3 of CPL). In ordinary cases, the 
investigation is carried out by the police but in serious cases, including the extortion of a 
confession by torture, the procuratorate alone performs the function of investigation (Article 
18 of CPL). There are reports, however, that from the end of 2016, the procuratorate has being 
undergoing substantial reform, and that its investigative function is largely being abolished, 
with more emphasis being placed on its main function of legal supervision (Long, 2018, 147). 
There is much confusion at the moment about the future function of the procuratorate which  
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illustrates well the fact that the recent transformation of the Chinese criminal procedural law 
has brought about a degree of uncertainty to the law. 
 
Chinese academics speak about three confusions (三乱) when discussing the current reforms 
of the procuratorate system. This condition was described by Zhang (2011) several years ago, 
and it is said to have been aggravated as the reforms proceeds (Long, 2018, 141) owing to the 
fact that procuratorates on all levels adopt different policies and practices in implementing the 
reforms. Zhang singled out confusion in the institutional setting (机构设置乱), confusion in 
institutional designation (机构名称乱 ), and confusion in the mechanism for delegating 
authority (派出机构). The increase of uncertainty as the reform proceeds might well illustrate 
well the philosophical dictum of Laozi against preoccupation with continuous intervention: 
“leaving muddy waters undisturbed will make it actually clear.”viii The prudent advice of Laozi 
seems to be largely ignored in contemporary China, as most Chinese academics and 
practitioners, including Zhang and Long argue for more regulations in the hope that new laws 
make the entire criminal justice process clear and smooth. This hope is likely be in vain 
considering the need for a greater shift in the fundamentals of Chinese criminal procedure than 
so far proposed.   
 
There is, certainly, something to be done about the confused role of the procuratorate. Guo 
(2017, pp. 46-7) explains that the Chinese procuratorate:  
is not a partisan prosecuting party as in adversarial systems. In contrast, it is not only a 
judicial organ but also a legal supervisory organ. Thus Chinese prosecutors have the 
authority as well as the obligation to exclude illegally obtained evidence to ensure the 
proper administration of criminal justice. However, wearing multiple hats, prosecutors 
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find it difficult to remain as neutral as they should be. In most cases, prosecutors fail to 
exclude illegally obtained evidence out of a desire to pursue the prosecution. 
 
He suggests that this unavoidable conflict of roles be solved by separating procuratorates 
according to their tasks: one section can deal with prosecutions, another with determining 
admissibility issues.  
 
The views of Guo have been reflected by a number of leading Chinese academics, such as Chen 
(2011, p. 236) who claimed that ‘the procuratorate cannot possibly have too great a role in 
excluding illegal evidence: it plays a greater role representing police and other official 
investigators in criminal litigation, and stands in an adversarial relationship to the defendant 
applying to exclude evidence’. This rather belies any idea that the procuratorate has a neutral 
obligation to exclude suspect confessions. The attempts to bring clarity into the operation of its 
diverse functions create a tension within the procuratorate, which on the one hand is based on 
a strict hierarchical principle and which at the same time has used its discretionary powers to 
develop extremely diverse practices at the grass roots levels (Long, 2018, p. 141). Any attempt 
to introduce more controls on the way in which evidence is collected will almost certainly be 
resisted on the grounds that it would affect the smoothness and speed of criminal proceedings. 
In many places, the procuratorate functions more as ‘a bridge between the police investigation 
and court procedures than as a discriminating screen’ (Lewis, 2011, pp. 652-653). There is also 
an uneasiness among the Chinese about the growing number of prosecutors (Lixin, 2009, p. 
327).  
 
The wheel of Chinese government reform turns fast and may turn in various directions. It is 
certainly appropriate that the procurator, who has to decide whether to initiate public 
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prosecution, must retain the power to examine the legality of evidence. The procurator stands 
nearer to the process of collecting evidence and is certainly better positioned than a judge to 
decide on the admissibility and reliability of evidence which he has to present to the court. 
During the process of approving arrest and the decision to prosecute, the 2017 Rules oblige the 
procurator in charge to inform the accused of his right to apply for the exclusion of illegal 
evidence (Article 16). The consequences of discovering that the evidence has been obtained 
illegally is that the procurator is barred from sanctioning detentions and initiating prosecution, 
unless there is other supporting evidence (Article 18).   
 
The role and power of the procurator reveals clearly the nature of Chinese riminal justice. It is 
certainly not adversarial. Is this system well suited for discovering the truth? Or does the 
partiality of the procurator as a prosecutor compromise the truthfulness of evidence submitted 
to the court? The 2012 reform of the CPL and 2017 Rules may provide sufficient normative 
grounds for a procurator to evaluate the legality of evidence submitted by the police. The doubt 
is whether he or she will be willing to ignore facts that may point to the illegality of such 
evidence. It is certain that much depends on the willingness of the interrogated person to report 
the facts of abuse, and also the willingness of the procurators to take such reports seriously. 
The 2017 Rules (Article 14) authorize the procurator to control the process of investigation in 
relation to illegal evidence not only at the request of the interrogated but also on his own 
initiative in more serious cases.  Yu (2017, p. 631) in his empirical study in an unidentified 
location of China on how prosecutors and investigation officers work together on the issue of 
admissibility of evidence concludes: ‘As long as the written evidence appears lawful in format 
and conforms to legal requirements, the police case is approved by prosecutors, disregarding 
the methods of construction.’ However, Guo (2017, pp. 46-47) refers in his empirical study to 
various cases where prosecutors were active in uncovering the illegality of evidence and 
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concluding that it is inadmissible. They do this when authorizing detention and more so when 
deciding on whether to initiate prosecution or not.  As noted above, Guo suggests creating a 
separate section in the procuratorate to rule on the admissibility of evidence, separate from 
those responsible for prosecution, in order to avoid any conflict of interest (2017, pp 46-47). 
In the cases he mentions, however, it seems that what persuades Chinese prosecutors to reject 
coerced confession is an awareness of the problem and a political will to stop malpractice in 
line with the current reform of criminal procedure in China.  
 
How long this political will lasts is open to question. Creating an additional controlling 
mechanism suggested by Guo could certainly prolong this current campaign, but it is unlikely 
to inspire further efforts. As with 2017 Rules, procedural mechanisms alone are not sufficient 
to enable procurators to exercise efficient control over the process of investigation. What is 
essential is the moral authority and respect they engender in the eyes of the other players in the 
system and the public, which will enable them to stand up to the police and create trust among 
accused to report the facts of procedural abuse.     
 
 
The Defence Lawyer and Truth 
 
In practice, if a defence lawyer, representing the accused, does not object to evidence, which 
is the normal defence response, a judge has very little ground for doubting the truthfulness or 
the provenance of the evidentiary materials submitted to him by the prosecution. Dobinson 
(2103) explains that a defence lawyer will usually see little point in challenging the event 
because this will very rarely have a positive result in terms of the verdict and is likely to 
increase the sentence imposed on his client. Further, such actions will open up the lawyer to 
23 
 
harassment and possibly even arrest by the authorities (see also Rongjie, 2013). At this point, 
it is worth noting that in the inquisitorial model, the defence lawyer traditionally has tended 
towards a passive role as regards the investigation and questioning of witnesses (Field & West, 
2003; Hodgson, 2005, ch. 4). As we saw above, in theory, it is possible for judges, on their 
own initiative, to ask for further information or seek it themselves. Further, Article 226 of 
Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Criminal Procedure 
Law of the People's Republic of China, 2012 states:  
 
During the trial, if the collegial panel discovers that the defendant has surrendered on his 
own initiative, confessed, or performed a meritorious service, that according to law is a 
mitigating circumstance, and if there is no relevant evidential materials in the file 
submitted by the People's Procuratorate, it shall notify the People's Procuratorate to 
submit it. 
 
It is apparent, however, that such information is more likely to be discovered and disclosed 
with the active involvement of a defence lawyer, rather than relying on the prosecutor to bring 
it to the attention of the court or the court making the relevant enquiries itself.  
 
At this stage, it should be noted that according to Article 42 of the CPL: 
 
No defense lawyer or any other person may help a criminal suspect or defendant conceal, 
destroy or fabricate evidence or collude with a criminal suspect or defendant to make 
confessions tally, or intimidate or induce witnesses to give false testimony or conduct 
other acts interfering with the proceedings of judicial organs. Any violation of the 
preceding paragraph shall be subject to the legal liability in accordance with the law. Any 
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alleged crime committed by a defender in this regard shall be handled by an investigating 
organ other than the investigating organ handling the case undertaken by the defender. 
 
While this imposes similar duties as an ‘officer of the court’ on the defence lawyer as elsewhere 
(Ashworth and Redmayne, 2010, pp. 65, 73), at the same time, the 2012 reform has given 
defense lawyers more rights to gain access to evidence. Article 39 of the CPL states that if the 
defence thinks that a public security organ or the procuratorate has failed to submit evidence 
gathered during the pre-trial proceedings which ‘can prove that the criminal suspect or 
defendant is innocent or the crime involved is a petty offense’, the defence is entitled to apply 
to the procuratorate or the court to obtain such evidence. In other words, finding the truth will 
depend sometimes not only on the truthfulness and completeness of the evidence submitted by 
the prosecution, but also upon the preparedness and persistence of defense lawyers in obtaining 
all the relevant evidence. As noted above, however, there are strong incentives for a defence 
lawyer to remain inactive. 
 
The powers of the defense lawyers to apply for disclosure of evidence held by the procuratorate 
is limited, as it is elsewhere, to material which is relevant (Ashworth and Redmayne, 2010, pp. 
238-248). It important to note, however, that, as is the norm in inquisitorial systems, the 
defence has access to the case file which has been passed from the police to the procuratorate. 
As regards any evidence which is not in the case file, the defence can seek disclosure, or 
discovery (in the American terminology), only if that evidence might show that the criminal 
suspect or defendant is innocent or there is a mitigating circumstance (Article 224 of the 
Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Criminal Procedure 
Law of the People's Republic of China, 2012). In this situation, the Chinese court, after 
receiving an application from the defence lawyer, can order the procuratorate to hand over any 
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evidentiary materials collected during the investigation, examination and prosecution, and it 
must do so within three days after receiving the letter from the court allowing the defence to 
obtain the evidence. Thus, it is not all the evidence in the prosecution file which the defence 
lawyer has the right to access but only that which can be demonstrated to the court as being 
important for proving the defendant’s innocence or the presence of a mitigating circumstance. 
In practice, however, Daum (2017, pp,, 5-6) claims that defence lawyers have had little success 
in securing records of medical inspections carried out upon their clients at detention centres in 
order to prove allegations of confessions being coerced. 
 
Witnesses and Truth 
The theoretical capacity of defence lawyers to challenge the background to and truthfulness of 
evidence submitted by the prosecution depends much on their access to witnesses and to the 
records of the latter’s earlier statements and testimony at trial. Much of this information 
remains out of the knowledge or control of the defence lawyer. A witness could have been 
subject to torture, violence, threats, etc. If so, it is vital that there is an opportunity for the 
defence to cross-examine witnesses. The fundamental problem faced by the Chinese criminal 
justice process is that witnesses are rarely examined in oral proceedings before the court (Wang 
and Caruso, 2017). As Lewis (2011, p. 665) observes, focusing ‘attention on in-court-testimony 
goes against deeply embedded practices in the criminal justice system’. For this reason, Belkin 
(2013, p. 104) explains that the new requirement for interrogators (usually the police) to testify 
in court where there are doubts over the admissibility of a confession is ‘unprecedented’ and, 
in the eyes of the police, demeaning to them (see also Lewis, 2011, pp. 665-666). Consequently, 
interrogators are rarely summoned to court to answer questions about the possible abuse of 
suspects who have confessed (Daum, 2017, pp. 6-7) 
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Tradition aside, there are several reasons why civilian witnesses in particular are rarely 
examined in open court proceedings, a significant factor being the unwillingness or fear of the 
witnesses themselves. To address this problem, Article 62 of the CPL put in place a number of 
measures to protect witnesses, including securing their anonymity. It is difficult, however, for 
the Chinese criminal justice system to create an atmosphere in which witnesses will willingly 
come forward and testify to the truth rather than having to be compelled to come to court, 
feeling anxious if not scared. Thus, obtaining the truth in any particular case will depend to a 
great extent on the attitude of witnesses to court proceedings. 
 
Since witnesses rarely attend trial proceedings, it would be natural to expect that defence 
lawyers should have an opportunity to meet them before the trial to evaluate them and their 
testimony. In various inquisitorial jurisdictions, for example, the Netherlands, witnesses 
traditionally were usually not called to give evidence at the trial (see Swart, 1993, p. 298) but 
the ECHR jurisprudence has disapproved of this practice and, nowadays, while there are 
various exceptions to the rule that witnesses must be available at trial for cross-examination, in 
such circumstances the defence must have the opportunity to question witnesses during the pre-
trial proceedings (Trechsel, 2005, pp. 305-322).  The Chinese position is less clear. Article 41 
of the CPL states the following: 
 
Defence lawyers may, with the consent of the witnesses or other units and individuals 
concerned, collect information pertaining to the current case from them and they may 
also apply to the People's Procuratorate or the People's Court for the collection and 
obtaining of evidence, or request the People's Court to inform the witnesses to appear in 
court and give testimony. With permission of the People's Procuratorate or the People's 
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Court and with the consent of the victim, his close relatives or the witnesses provided by 
the victim, defence lawyers may collect information pertaining to the current case from 
them. 
 
It should therefore be noted that defence access to witnesses and the latter’s appearance to 
answer questions at trial depends either upon witnesses being willing to cooperate before the 
trial or the court agreeing to them being compelled to appear at trial. 
 
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the modern state of Chinese criminal procedure 
law is unsatisfactory from the point of view of the defence. Quite simply, courtroom culture 
and broader social attitudes do not perceive it to be the norm that the accused will dispute his 
or her guilt nor that witnesses will give evidence at trial as a matter of course. In other words, 
the key problem to be resolved as regards the Chinese criminal trial is to make it commonplace 
for all testimony to be heard before the judge in open court and for witnesses to accept that this 
is the usual procedure. Despite significant efforts to make this possible, the new normative 
framework still remains powerless to give life to a trial that is centered on obtaining the truth 
without any element of compulsion being involved. Culture and tradition need to change in 
order to create a meaningful trial. 
 
Conclusion 
The reform of criminal procedure in China did not stop with the issue of the ‘2010 Evidence 
Rules’ and the revisions to the CPL in 2012. By October 2014, the 18th Central Committee of 
the Communist Party had announced a new policy to reform the Chinese court system generally 
and criminal justice particularly.ix There is an awareness that the trial proceedings remain a 
formality, whereby the court simply approves or ‘rubber-stamps’ the findings presented to it 
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by the procuratorate. Therefore, in February 2015, the Supreme Court of the PRC published 
guidelines for the reform of court proceedings according to which the examination of the facts 
(including cross-examination) must become the central part of the trial. (Sun, 2018). 
Unfortunately, modern Chinese scholarship tends to focus on how to perfect procedural 
mechanisms to achieve this rather than on how to change the fundamental intellectual and 
moral attitude to the idea of trial among ordinary people. As a leading Chinese academic, Chen 
(2010, p. 529), wrote: ‘Any perfect modem system and management expertise and any cutting-
edge technologies would turn into a pile of waste paper in the hands of a bunch of traditional 
minded people’ (see also Long, 2015). In similar vein are Lewis’ comments on the introduction 
of the exclusionary rules: ‘This move will require that assertive actors in the criminal justice 
system gain a toehold and gradually move the rule from the realm of gloss to substance.’ (2011, 
p. 636). 
 
The same conclusion can be applied to the belief of Chen (2010, p. 518) and Zuo (2015), as 
well as other prominent Chinese academic scholars, that the only way to procedural fairness is 
an increase of the adversarial elements in Chinese criminal procedure. Adversarial mechanisms 
are unlikely to work in a society where the defence, on one side, is not - and presently cannot 
- be perceived as an equal party to the police and prosecution, on the other side, even if the 
Chinese judge poses himself as an independent arbiter. To change this system might require a 
cardinal departure away from a single-party authoritarian state towards a pluralistic society 
with independent courts and even independent procuratorate. 
 
In brief, an open trial with active participation of witnesses and the defence will remain an 
unachievable goal without a fundamental shift in the way how the ‘truth’ is obtained. At the 
moment, the primary method of finding the truth is the inquisitorial work of investigators, in 
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securing a confession, the procuratorate, in confirming the acccused’s confession, and to a 
lesser degree, the judges in validating it. It is difficult to reconcile this with the concept of 
procedural fairness which the Chinese written law now tries to reflect. The search for truth and 
procedural fairness can be reconciled only if truth is obtained through an active and open 
interaction of the prosecution, the defence and/or accused, the victim and other witnesses in a 
public forum. This interaction does not need to be antagonistic and confrontational in the same 
manner as it is perceived in the West where adversarial trial carries a sense of mutual hostility. 
Chinese culture and values, as described briefly above, could contribute to a more cooperative 
and less partisan context for seeking the truth. Whatever form the adversarial aspects of 
criminal procedure take in China, its future depends not so much on the form and content of 
legislative acts, as on the readiness and willingness of the participants to engage willingly in 
an open trial. 
 
However, it is still possible for procedural fairness to play a greater role in Chinese criminal 
justice system within the current political milieu of China. This would be possible not purely 
through introducing a more perfect external administrative and regulatory mechanism 
controlling the hosts of Chinese police, procurators, and judges. Rather, procedural fairness 
needs an internal moral foundation shared by the participants in a legal process which cannot 
be built through the mechanical reform of the governmental system. It might be built by means 
of reintroduction of the traditional Confucian values of humanity into the Chinese 
governmental machinery, but this introduction will unlikely be fruitful in a society driven 
primarily by material greed rather than by the love of virtue. 
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